Using statistically designed experiments for safety system optimization by Lisa Jackson (1250010) & J.D. Andrews (7120562)
 
 
 
This item was submitted to Loughborough’s Institutional Repository 
(https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/) by the author and is made available under the 
following Creative Commons Licence conditions. 
 
 
 
 
 
For the full text of this licence, please go to: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ 
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safety system optimization
J D Andrews and L M Bartlett*
Department of Aeronautical and Automotive Engineering, Loughborough University, Loughborough, Leicestershire, UK
Abstract: This paper describes the method of statistically designed experiments (SDEs) which is used as
a structured method to investigate the best setting for a number of decision variables in a system design
problem. Traditionally, in the design of safety-critical systems, a trial and error type approach is undertaken
to achieve a  nal system that meets the design objectives. This approach can be time consuming, and
often only an adequate design is found rather than the optimal design for the available resources. Optimal use
of resources should be imperative when possible lives are at risk. To demonstrate the practicality of this new
structured approach for optimizing a safety system design, a high-integrity safety system has been used.
Each design is analysed using the binary decision diagram analysis technique to establish the system
unavailability, which is penalized if the system constraints are exceeded. System constraints indicate the
limitations on the resources that can be utilized. The SDE approach highlights good and bad settings for
possible design variables. This knowledge can then be used by more sophisticated search techniques. The
latter part of this paper analyses the results from the best design generated using the SDE, for further
optimization using localized optimization approaches.
Keywords: statistically designed experiments, fault tree analysis, binary decision diagrams, optimization,
safety systems
NOTATION
Cpen penalty for exceeding total cost constraint
ESD emergency shutdown
HIPS high-integrity protection system
MDTpen penalty for exceedingmaintenance downtime
constraint
QSYS system unavailability
Q0SYS penalized system unavailability
SDE statistically designed experiment
STpen penalty for exceeding spurious trip constraint
1 INTRODUCTION
Safety systems are designed to operate when certain condi-
tions occur and act to prevent their development into a
hazardous situation. To minimize the risk the potential
situation poses to members of the work force or public,
it is essential that they have the maximum possible like-
lihood of working on demand for the resources available.
Techniques such as fault tree analysis [1], networks [2],
Markov analysis [3] and simulation [4] are now commonly
used for system availability assessment. However, they are
usually used in the traditional engineering design process.
This involves setting values of a potentially large number of
decision variables, and then adjusting them either one at a
time or by trial and error until an acceptable design
performance is achieved. One criterion used to determine
the adequacy of the design is a comparison with a prede-
termined target  gure for its availability. This gives rise to
an inef cient, unstructured design process, which will result
in a design that is unlikely to make best use of available
resources.
It is unlikely that the full implicationsof setting the design
variables could be understood for complex systems and
therefore unlikely that the design parameters can bemanually
selected to yield optimal system safety performance. An
approach using fault tree analysis to predict the system
availability of each system design has been used in conjunc-
tion with the grid-samplingmethod to  nd the optimal design
[5]. Improvements in this approach have been made using
binary decision diagrams [6–10], and also by incorporation
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of a genetic algorithm [11, 12] to perform the optimization.
This optimization technique allows a number of design
alternatives to be investigated simultaneously. In using
these search-based optimization techniques, the outcome is
heavily reliant on the start point of the search.
An alternative to the traditional ad hoc approach to
engineering design is statistically designed experiments
(SDEs), which are a structured method to investigate the
best settings for a potentially large number of decision
variables [13, 14]. Statistical design of experiments means
making many purposeful design changes at once and
conducting several tests and evaluations before decisions
are taken as to what the next steps in the development
process should be. In this paper, the experimental design
concepts are being used to try to gain a good starting point
for the optimization. The better the starting point, the more
ef cient the optimization will be. In this way it is hoped to
achieve about 80 per cent of the work required to reach an
optimal design using about 20 per cent of the effort. The
research shows, by means of application to a safety system,
that adopting this approach can lead to generating an
optimal design in a much more ef cient manner than
when applying traditional design processes. In addition,
the technique can be used to search out good starting
points, which can be used by more sophisticated optimiza-
tion techniques to  nd the best system con guration.
2 STATISTICALLY DESIGNED EXPERIMENTS
2.1 Components of an SDE
In an SDE the variables to be changed are called factors.
Prior to conducting an SDE (otherwise known as a factorial
experiment), all factors must be identi ed and the possible
values of each factor determined. These possible values are
termed levels. The performance of the engineering system is
characterized by a measurement of some aspect or function
termed the response.
Purposeful design changes are determined using special
matrices called orthogonal arrays. Consider, for example, a
particular system consisting of three parameters: number of
valves (A), valve type (B) and number of pressure trans-
mitters (C). As regards each parameter, two settings are
chosen to cover the range of interest. These factor levels
de ne the experimental region and are listed in Table 1.
The goal is to minimize system unavailability, and, as
such, the response is the probability of system failure, QSYS.
The matrix experiment to de ne the experimental plan is
stated in Table 2. It consists of four individual experiment
designs corresponding to the four rows. The three columns
of the matrix represent the three factors whose values are
indicated in Table 1. Thus, the  rst design consists of two
valves of type 1 and four pressure transmitters. The matrix
experiment is the standard orthogonal array L4 [15]. For any
pair of columns, all combinations of factor levels occur, and
they occur an equal number of times. This is called the
balancing property and it implies orthogonality. This balan-
cing property inherent in orthogonal arrays enables the
identi cation of which design changes make the difference
to the performance of a design.
A matrix experiment consisting of all possible combinations
of the factors is termed ‘full factorial’. The run size for a two-
level full factorial design in k factors is 2k, which quickly
becomes prohibitive for a moderate amount of factors. The
problem is exacerbated for factorswith more than two levels.A
subset or fraction of the full factorial design (a fractional
factorial) tends to be used unless there are only a few potentially
important factors to be studied. In the example above, the
orthogonalarray representsa ‘one-halffraction’of the23design.
2.2 Steps in a statistically designed experiment
An outline of the statistically designed experimental proce-
dure is as follows:
1. De nition of the aim of the experimental plan and
selection of the response variable.
2. Selection of the factors that will be changed and the
levels that will be used.
3. Choice of a matrix experiment such that the plan has a
systematic and balanced pattern.
4. Analysis of the data from the matrix experiment to
determine the effects of the various factors. The effects
of the various factors can be determined by computing
simple averages. The estimates of the factor effects are
then used to determine the optimum factor settings.
5. Summary of the results in a response table and effects
plot. The use of engineering knowledge and common
sense is essential in interpreting the results.
6. Validation of conclusions from the experiment using
follow-up runs and con rmation testing.
Table 1 Factor levelsde ning the
experimental region
Levels
Factor 1 2
A: Number of valves 2 3
B: Valve type 1 2
C: Number of PTs 4 5
Table 2 Experimental plan—L4(2
3)
orthogonal array
Columns
Experiment
number 1 2 3 QSYS
1 1 1 1 0.2
2 1 2 2 0.4
3 2 1 2 0.3
4 2 2 1 0.2
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3 SAFETY SYSTEM DESIGN EXAMPLE
The high-integrity protection system (HIPS) has been used
previously to demonstrate design optimization using genetic
algorithms [11, 12]. The full design considerations are
outlined within these papers, along with the binary decision
diagram technique,which is used to assess the availability of
each design. The basic features of the system are shown
in Fig. 1.
Its function is to prevent a high-pressure surge passing
through the system. In this way, protection is provided for
processing equipment whose pressure rating would be
exceeded. The high pressure originates from a production
well of a not normally manned offshore platform, and the
pieces of equipment to be protected are vessels located
downstream on the processing platform.
The  rst level of protection is the emergency shutdown
(ESD) subsystem. Pressure in the pipeline is monitored
using pressure transmitters (PTs). When the pipeline pres-
sure exceeds the permitted value, then the ESD system acts
to close the wing and master valves on the well, together
with any ESD valves that have been  tted.
To provide an additional level of protection, a second
level of redundancy can be incorporated by the inclusion of
a HIPS. This works in a similar manner to the ESD system
but is completely independent in operation.
Even with a relatively simple system such as this there are
a vast number of options for the designer to consider. In this
example it is required to determine values for the design
variables that represent the following:
1. How many ESD valves are required (0, 1, 2)? E
2. How many HIPS valves are required (1, 2)? H
3. How many pressure transmitters for each
subsystem (1, 2, 3, 4)? N1, N2
4. How many transmitters are required to trip? K1, K2
5. Which of two possible ESD/HIPS valves
to select? V
6. Which of two possible pressure transmitters
to select? P
7. Maintenance test interval for each subsystem
(1 week–2 years)? y1, y2
Limitations have been placed on the design such that:
1. The total system cost must be less than 1000 units.
Hardware costs are given in Table 3.
2. The average time each year that the system resides in the
down state owing to preventive maintenance must be less
than 130h. Times taken to test each component at each
maintenance test are also shown in Table 3.
3. The number of times that a spurious system shutdown
occurs would be unacceptable if it were more than once
per year.
To assess the performance of a potential system design, the
system unavailability needs to be considered along with the
Fig. 1 High-integrity protection system
Table 3 Component data
Component
Dormant
failure rate
Dormant mean
repair time
Spurious
failure rate
Spurious mean
repair time Cost Test time
Wing valve 1.14£10¡5 36.0 1£10¡6 36.0 100 12
Master valve 1.14£10¡5 36.0 1£10¡6 36.0 100 12
HIPS1 5.44£10¡6 36.0 5£10¡7 36.0 250 15
HIPS2 1£10¡5 36.0 1£10¡5 36.0 200 10
ESDV1 5.44£10¡6 36.0 5£10¡7 36.0 250 15
ESDV2 1£10¡5 36.0 1£10¡5 36.0 200 10
Solenoid valve 5£10¡6 36.0 5£10¡7 36.0 20 5
Relay contacts 0.23£10¡6 36.0 2£10¡6 36.0 1 2
PT1 1.5£10¡6 36.0 1.5£10¡5 36.0 20 1
PT2 7£10¡6 36.0 7£10¡5 36.0 10 2
Computer logic unit 1£10¡5 36.0 1£10¡5 36.0 20 1
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limitations that are placed on the system. Thus, the perfor-
mance depends on four parts:
(a) the probability of system failure (unavailability, QSYS);
(b) a penalty for the design exceeding the total cost
constraint, Cpen;
(c) a penalty for exceeding the total maintenance downtime
constraint, MDTpen;
(d) a penalty for exceeding the spurioustrip constraint,STpen.
These are combined to give a sole value to represent system
performance for each design, referred to as the penalized
system unavailability of the design. Calculating the pena-
lized system unavailability,Q0SYS, involves the derivation of
the penalty formula for excess cost, maintenance downtime
and spurious trip occurrences [11]. If a particular design
exceeds any of the stated limits, the respective penalty is
added to the system unavailability of the design in question
Q0SYS ˆ QSYS ‡ Cpen‡MDTpen‡ STpen (1)
QSYS is calculated from the binary design diagram repre-
sentation of the system fault tree using component failure
and repair data given in Table 3.
4 APPLICATION OF THE STATISTICALLY
DESIGNED EXPERIMENT TO
OPTIMIZE THE HIPS
4.1 Aim and response variable
The means by which the performance of a safety system
design is assessed (i.e. the response variable) is chosen to be
the penalized system unavailability,Q0SYS. The primary goal
is to determine the optimal level of each design variable such
that Q0SYS is minimized. The secondary goal, which is
addressed throughout the experimental procedure, is to
determine the effect (or lack of effect) that each design
variable has on QSYS, maintenance downtime, cost and the
spurious trip frequency. The SDE is essentially a global
optimization procedure that initially encompasses a large
proportion of the entire search space. Attainment of the
global minimum, i.e. the primary goal, with this somewhat
crude approach is unexpected. However, it is expected,
through attention to the latter goal, to determine promising
areas in the search space and hence a starting point, or points,
from which to commence a more sophisticated approach.
4.2 Choice of factors and levels
All ten parameters associated with the HIPS were included
to perform the initial experiment. The intention was to
screen out the less important factors before carrying out a
more detailed follow-up experiment. Levels of the factors
should be chosen to be suf ciently far apart to cover a wide
experimental region. This makes it possible to identify good
and bad regions of the search space. During subsequent
re nement, experiment levels closer to one another can be
chosen. Each factor and their alternate levels selected for
consideration are listed in Table 4.
4.3 Matrix experiment
An ef cient way to study the effects of several factors simulta-
neously is to plan a matrix experiment using an orthogonal
array. An orthogonalarray is constructed from the knowledgeof
the number of factors, their levels and the desire to study
interactions. In this initial experiment there are  ve two-level
factors and  ve three-level factors. For the purpose of the
screening experiment it was decided not to study speci c
interactions.Using the standard methods of constructing ortho-
gonal arrays, the standard array L27(3
13) was selected for the
matrix experiment. References [16] and [17] provide further
detail on array construction and standard arrays. The standard
array has 13 columns and 27 rows. Each row has three distinct
entries, namely 1, 2 and 3 (i.e. each column is a three-level
column). As such, a three-level factor can be assigned directly
to any column. Five of the chosen factors have two levels. The
dummy level techniquewas used to assign each two-level factor
to a three-level factor. The dummy level techniqueworks on the
basis that, if a factor A has two levels A1 and A2, it can be
assigned to a three-level column by creating a dummy level A3,
which could be taken to be the same as either A1 or A2. For a
more detailed explanation, refer to reference [18].
The modi ed L27(2
538) array representing the 27 safety
system designs to be investigated is translated using the
level de nition in Table 4 to create a clear experimental plan
(see Table 5). Each design, dictated by the matrix experi-
ment, was analysed using equation (1). The  nal column of
Table 5 gives the resulting penalized unavailability of the
speci ed system design.
4.4 Data analysis
Data analysis is concerned with estimating the effect of each
parameter on the penalized system unavailability over the 27
designs investigated. The overall mean value of Q0SYS for the
experimental region was 0.0342. The effect of a factor is
de ned to be the change in the response produced by a
change in the level of the factor. This is commonly termed
the main effect. For example, the main effect of the valve
type parameter at level 1, V1, is given by
mV1 ˆ
1
18
X18
iˆ1
Q0iSYS ˆ 0:0299
Table 4 Factors and associated levels
Levels
Factor 1 2 3
E 0 1 2
K1 1 2
N1 2 3 4
H 1 2
K2 1 2
N2 2 3 4
V 1 2
P 1 2
y1 30 40 50
y2 30 40 50
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where mV1 denotes the main effect of parameter V at level 1,
and Q0iSYS denotes the penalized system unavailability for
design i.
Themain effect of each factor at eachof its levels is speci ed
in Table 6. A better feel for the relative effect of the different
factors can be obtained using the analysis of variance
(ANOVA) technique. The sum of squares due to factor V,
SSV, is equal to the total squared deviation of each level of V
from the overall mean, m. Eighteen designs are investigated
with V at level 1, and nine designs with V at level 2. Thus
SSV ˆ 18(mV1 ¡ m)2 ‡ 9(mV2 ¡ m)2
ˆ 9:8 £ 10¡4
The sum of squares due to each factor can be seen in Table 6.
This table indicates that the parameter P governing the
pressure transmitter type contributes a major proportion of
the total variation in Q0SYS. In fact, it is responsible for 83.1
per cent of the variation.
4.5 Selecting optimum factor levels
The primary goal in conducting the matrix experiment is to
determine the best or optimum level for each factor. As
regards the HIPS, the optimum level for each factor is the
level that gives the lowest value of Q0SYS in the experimental
region. The estimated main effects can be used for this
purpose. Therefore, the settings V1, P1, E1, K12, N12, H1,
K22, N21, y11, y21 would give the lowest penalized system
unavailability. Note that the subscript denotes the level of
that parameter.
The predicted best settings need not correspond to one of
the rows in the matrix experiment (Table 5), as is the case
here. Prior to implementing any design suggested by
the technique, it must be fully evaluated. The con rmed
Table 5 Clear experimental plan
Design V P E K1 N1 H K2 N2 y1 y2 Q0SYS
1 1 1 0 1 2 1 1 2 30 30 1.4e¡3
2 1 1 0 1 3 1 2 3 40 40 2.51e¡3
3 1 1 0 1 4 2 2 4 50 50 2.07e¡3
4 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 3 40 40 2.98e¡3
5 1 1 1 2 3 1 2 4 50 50 3.59e¡3
6 1 1 1 2 4 2 2 2 30 30 7.46e¡3
7 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 4 50 50 0.1104
8 1 2 2 2 3 1 2 2 30 30 9.67e¡3
9 1 2 2 2 4 2 2 3 40 40 0.109
10 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 40 50 4.2e¡3
11 1 1 1 2 3 1 1 3 50 30 3.11e¡3
12 1 1 1 2 4 2 2 4 30 40 2.97e¡3
13 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 3 50 30 2.91e¡3
14 1 1 2 1 3 1 1 4 30 40 0.0217
15 1 1 2 1 4 2 2 2 40 50 5.19e¡3
16 1 2 0 2 2 1 2 4 30 40 0.0442
17 1 2 0 2 3 1 1 2 40 50 0.1017
18 1 2 0 2 4 2 2 3 50 30 0.1024
19 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 50 40 4.36e¡3
20 2 1 2 2 3 1 2 3 30 50 4.32e¡3
21 2 1 2 2 4 2 1 4 40 30 0.0573
22 2 1 0 2 2 1 2 3 30 50 1.6e¡3
23 2 1 0 2 3 1 2 4 40 30 2.31e¡3
24 2 1 0 2 4 2 1 2 50 40 3.87e¡3
25 2 2 1 1 2 1 2 3 40 30 0.1025
26 2 2 1 1 3 1 2 2 50 40 0.1054
27 2 2 1 1 4 2 1 4 30 50 0.1026
Table 6 Main effects
Main effect
Sum of squares
Factor Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 (ANOVA) % ANOVA
V 0.0299 0.0427 9.8e¡4 2.1
P 4.43e¡3 0.0876 0.0386 83.1
E 0.0291 0.0372 0.0361 3.5e¡4 0.75
K1 0.0385 0.032 2.5e¡4 0.5
N1 0.0305 0.0282 0.0437 1.3e¡3 2.7
H 0.0316 0.0394 3.6e¡4 0.8
K2 0.045 0.0287 1.6e¡3 3.4
N2 0.027 0.0369 0.0385 7.0e¡4 1.5
y1 0.0218 0.0431 0.0376 2.2e¡3 4.8
y2 0.0321 0.0331 0.0373 1.4e¡4 0.3
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performance characteristics associated with the estimated
optimal design are a MDT of 112.7 h, a cost of 652 units, a
spurious trip frequency of 0.28/year, a system unavailability
of 0.0016 and therefore a penalized system unavailability of
0.0016.
The value ofQ0SYS realized for the predicted best settings is
not as good as the best among the rows of the matrix
experiment. The cause of this could be the coarse nature of
the approach, or it may indicate the presence of signi cant
interactions among the variables. Realization that the design
proposed does not meet the desired optimal target means that
practical implementation is not carried out and additional
analysis and investigation are needed to  nd better settings.
4.6 Additional analysis
The main effects of the factors are their independent effects.
If the effect of a factor depends on the level of another, then
the two factors are said to have an interaction. Within
engineering applications this interaction is commonplace.
For example, if there is redundancy within the system in the
form of a two out of three voting set-up, changing the level
of redundancy has a direct effect on the number of compo-
nents required to trip the system. For the HIPS, the large
effect of parameter P dominates the effect of the other
parameters. The variables in the trip mechanism, such as
the number of pressure transmitters, the number required to
trip and the type of pressure transmitter, are likely to have
related effects. The main effects (shown diagrammatically in
Fig. 2) clearly indicate that pressure transmitter type 1 is the
optimum level for this factor.
As such, the main effects of K1, N1, K2 and N2 are
revised using only a subset of the designs in the L27 array.
That is, those designs with P set at level 1. The main effects
(penalized system unavailability) for each of these variables
for P at level 1 are speci ed in Table 7.
It can be seen that the optimal settings for K1, N1, K2 and
N2 at P1 are levels 1, 1, 2 and 2 respectively. This gives a
design speci ed by a one from two trip con guration for
subsystem 1 and a two from three trip con guration for
subsystem 2. A con rmation run of the revised prediction
specifying the best design gives a MDT of 112.7 h, a cost of
652 units, a spurious trip frequency of 0.54/year and a
probability of system unavailability of 0.0014 (no penalties
incurred). It is an improvement over the initial prediction
and equals the best in the original experiments table, i.e. as
shown by design 1 of Table 8.
4.7 Considerations for follow-up experiment
To carry out a follow-up experiment, it must be determined
which factors besides P have a strong effect on the response.
It was noted that the main effects of each parameter were
biased by signi cantly large values of Q0SYS, which resulted
from the exertion of penalties due to constraint violations.
To investigate this further, the effect of each parameter on
system cost, MDT and spurious trip frequency, F 0SYS, was
established.
The main effect of each factor level with respect to system
cost is shown in Table 9, as well as the sum of squares due to
each factor and the percentage of variation for which the
factor is responsible. These  gures were also calculated for
MDT (Table 10) and spurious trip frequency (Table 11).
Factor E was found to explain a major proportion of the total
variation in cost, 87 per cent, with H being the next largest
contributor at 6 per cent.
Fig. 2 Plot of the main effect of each factor
Table 7 Main effects with P at level 1
Main effect for P at level 1
Factor Level 1 Level 2 Level 3
K1 0.00596 0.0081725
N1 0.002908 0.0062567 0.0131433
K2 0.01506 0.0036225
N2 0.00443 0.0038517 0.010188
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Variables E, y1 and H were calculated to account for a
large proportion of the total variation in MDT. To a
lesser extent, V was also found to contribute to the variation
in MDT.
The parameters that contribute to the variation in spurious
trip frequency were found to be those associated with the
pressure transmitters. However, the parameter governing the
pressure transmitter type accounted for over 50 per cent of
the variation alone. A design that constitutes pressure
transmitters of type 2 generally has a high spurious trip
frequency and hence receives a substantial penalty. This
explains the dominance of parameter P regarding variation
in the penalized system unavailability. Signi cant variation
in the trip frequency still exists in many of the parameters
when only those designs in the matrix with pressure
transmitter type 1 are considered. However, this variation
occurs below the spurious trip limit (i.e. 1.0). Owing to their
in uence on the constraints of the safety system design, it
was decided to carry out a follow-up experiment addressing
parameters E, H, V, y2 and y1 speci cally.
5 FOLLOW-UP EXPERIMENT
A follow-up experiment involving fewer factors was used to
explore the response–factor relationship in more detail. The
purpose of this step is to verify that the optimum conditions
Table 9 Main effects and variance of each factor with respect
to cost
Main effect with respect to cost
Sum of
Factor Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 squares %ANOVA
V 1010.8 895.4 79903 6.1
P 992 933.1 20815 1.6
E 719.8 973.1 1224.2 1144894 86.9
K1 970.9 923.4 43238 3.3
N1 939.8 982 995.3 15114 1.1
H 960.9 995.3 7100 0.5
K2 978.7 969.2 542 0.04
N2 956.4 990.9 969.8 5445 0.4
y1 973.1 973.1 970.9 29 0.002
y2 970.9 973.1 973.1 29 0.002
Table 11 Main effects and variance of each factor with respect
to FSYS
Main effect with respect to F0SYS
Sum of
Factor Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 squares %ANOVA
V 0.91 1.23 0.62 4.5
P 0.66 1.77 7.4 53.3
E 0.91 1.14 1.04 0.24 1.7
K1 1.31 0.89 1.06 7.6
N1 0.97 0.82 1.3 1.07 7.7
H 1.04 1.02 2.7e¡3 0.02
K2 1.5 0.81 2.6 18.7
N2 0.85 1.11 1.13 0.44 3.2
y1 1.06 1.02 1.01 0.13 0.09
y2 0.9 0.99 1.2 0.43 3.1
Table 10 Main effects and variance of each factor with respect
to MDT
Main effect with respect to MDT
Sum of
Factor Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 squares % ANOVA
V 128.3 112.9 1432.2 5.2
P 123.6 249.9 373.5 1.3
E 96.14 125.8 147.7 12052.3 43.7
K1 123 123.3 0.4 0.001
N1 116 126.2 127.4 707.1 2.6
H 114.7 140.2 3919.9 14.2
K2 123.6 123 2.2 0.008
N2 122.1 123.7 123.9 17 0.06
y1 146 119.3 104.2 8064.4 29.2
y2 123.9 121.9 112.7 1011.9 3.7
Table 8 Fitness data for each design, plus averages
Design 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Cost 632 672 982 922 962 1212 1152 1142 1432
MDT 110.9 85.8 91.5 110.5 90.5 183.7 116.5 190.7 174.2
FSYS 0.803 0.673 0.813 0.681 0.29 0.56 2.45 0.555 1.53
QSYS 1.4e¡3 2.51e¡3 2.07e¡3 2.98e¡3 3.59e¡3 8.6e¡4 8.28e¡3 2.25e¡3 1.25e¡3
Q0SYS 1.4e¡3 2.51e¡3 2.07e¡3 2.98e¡3 3.59e¡3 7.46e¡3 0.1104 9.67e¡3 0.109
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
Cost 902 1212 982 1172 1502 1212 612 872 622
MDT 102.7 142.1 140.8 126.2 199.8 131.3 111.4 104.8 97.1
FSYS 0.289 0.690 0.552 0.298 1.22 0.828 1.183 1.515 1.51
QSYS 4.2e¡3 1.12e¡3 1.74e¡3 2.91e¡3 8.98e¡3 3.25e¡3 4.19e¡3 1.73e¡3 2.45e¡3
Q0SYS 4.2e¡3 3.11e¡3 2.97e¡3 2.91e¡3 0.0217 5.19e¡3 0.0442 0.1017 0.1024
19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 Average
Cost 1242 1062 1102 822 642 622 1002 772 792 972.4
MDT 117.3 142.2 130.4 105 90.1 68.6 143.9 88.9 129 123.2
FSYS 0.638 0.547 1.33 0.455 0.364 0.886 1.96 1.56 3.66 1.03
QSYS 4.1e¡3 2.29e¡3 2.13e¡3 1.6e¡3 2.31e¡3 3.87e¡3 9.35e¡3 5.36e¡3 2.62e¡3 0.003
Q0SYS 4.36e¡3 4.32e¡3 0.0573 1.6e¡3 2.31e¡3 3.87e¡3 0.1025 0.1054 0.1026 0.0342
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suggested by the initial matrix experiment are indeed
accurate and determine whether improvements can be
made. It is possible that the veri cation experiment may
identify strong interactions between parameters and high-
light potentially misleading information. The factors
selected for the follow-up experiment and their alternative
levels are given in Table 12.
Observations from the screening experiment implied that
the inclusion of three ESD valves is not bene cial, and the
variable is now only set at two levels. The remaining
variables were set to pressure transmitter type 1 with a trip
con guration of one from two and two from three pressure
transmitters for the ESD subsystem and HIPS subsystem
respectively. These parameter values are the best settings
predicted in the screening experiment.
In this study it was decided not only to estimate the main
effects of the  ve factors listed in Table 12, but also to
estimate four potential interactions identi ed from engineer-
ing experience. The four interactions considered to be most
important were:
(a) valve type and ESD valve number, V6E;
(b) valve type and HIPS valve number, V6H;
(c) ESD valve number and HIPS valve number, E6H;
(d) test interval 1 and test interval 2, y16 y2.
The matrix experiment to take account of the  ve factors
and the four interactions is given in Table 13 (see reference
[16] for details of experimental design construction). The
values of the levels of each factor are given in the table as
opposed to using their level code. This gives a clearer
indication of the design characteristics being investigated
in each run.
The average values for system unavailability, cost, MDT,
spurious trip frequency, system unavailability and penalized
system unavailability for all designs are 1.266 10¡3, 855.1
units, 132h, 0.63/year and 2.66 10¡3 respectively. The best
design is represented in column 24 of Table 13 and has a
system unavailability of 7.366 10¡4 (costˆ 822 units,
MDTˆ 130 h, spurious trip frequencyˆ 0.72/year).
5.1 Data analysis
As with the  rst experiment, the main effect of each factor
with respect to the penalized system unavailability was
calculated and is shown in Table 14 and the effects plot in
(Fig. 3). It was estimated from the main effects that the
settings V2, E1, H1, y14 and y24 would give the lowest
penalized system unavailability,where the subscript number
identi es the factor level. A con rmation run gives MDTˆ
78 h, costˆ 602 units, spurious trip frequencyˆ 0.625 per
year and probability of system unavailabilityˆ 0.0031 (no
penalties incurred). This design is poor compared with the
best design from the follow-up experiment, the unavailabil-
ity of which is considerably less at 7.366 10¡4. Also, the
cost of this design is only 622 units, indicating the possi-
bility of utilizing further resources. Therefore, consideration
is given to the key interactions.
Table 15 and Fig. 4 represent the data for the interactions
V6E and V6H. Speci cally, the main effect of factor E is
Table 12 Factor levels in the follow-up
experiment
Levels
Factor 1 2 3 4
V 1 2
E 1 2
H 0 1
y1 25 30 35 40
y2 25 30 35 40
Table 13 Matrix experiment
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
V 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
E 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
H 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
y1 25 25 30 30 35 35 40 40 35 35 40 40 25 25 30 30
y2 25 30 35 40 25 30 35 40 25 30 35 40 25 30 35 40
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
V 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
E 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
H 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 2
y1 35 35 40 40 25 25 30 30 25 25 30 30 35 35 40 40
y2 35 40 25 30 35 40 25 30 35 40 25 30 35 40 25 30
Table 14 Main effects of factors with respect to penalized
system unavailability
Level
Factor 1 2 3 4
V 3.32e¡3 1.46e¡3
E 1.93e¡3 3.27e¡3
H 1.97e¡3 3.22e¡3
y1 3.81e¡3 2.59e¡3 2.12e¡3 1.87e¡3
y2 3.37e¡3 2.46e¡3 2.32e¡3 2.23e¡3
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calculated at the  rst level of factor V, then at the second
level of factor V; V6H is considered in a similar manner.
The effects for E6H and y16 y2 are also given in
Tables 16 and 17 and visually in Fig. 5.
If there is no interaction between two factors, an effects
plot of one factor against both levels of the other will portray
two parallel lines. No interaction implies that a change in
level of one factor will produce the same change in the
response regardless of the level of the other factor. In this
case, the optimum levels identi ed by the main effects are
valid. If the lines in the effects plot are not parallel but have
the same direction of movement, then an interaction is
present. However, the optimum levels identi ed in the
main effects are likely still be to valid. This is termed a
synergistic interaction.However, an inconsistent direction of
movement on the effects plot implies a strong interaction
between the factors. In such cases the optimum level
identi ed by the main effects may be misleading. This is
termed an antisynergistic interaction.
It is apparent from the main effect and interaction
plots that:
1. There is a synergistic interaction between the parameters
V and E and V and H. The interaction is stronger in the
former. The best settings for the parameters levels V, E
and H are 2, 1 and 1 respectively (i.e. valve type 2 with
no ESD valves and one HIPS valve).
2. There is an antisynergistic interaction between para-
meters E and H. This makes sense as both incur
signi cant cost to the design. The results from the
interaction investigation contradict the main effects data
which indicated that, when the number of ESD valves is
0 (its optimal setting), the best level for factor H is 2 (i.e.
two HIPS valves  tted).
3. Strong interaction exists between the maintenance test
interval parameters, and, as such, the main effects
associated with y1 and y2 may be misleading. The
implication from Fig. 5 is that the higher maintenance
test interval values are generally bene cial. This is due
to the fact that such values do not incur a penalty as a
Fig. 3 Main effects plot of factors in follow-up experiment
Table 15 V6E and V6H interaction effects
E H
V 1 2 1 2
1 3.65e¡3 7.21e¡3 1.83e¡3 4.7e¡3
2 1.75e¡3 1.99e¡3 1.3e¡3 2.4e¡3
Fig. 4 Effects plot for V6H and V6E
Table 16 E6H interaction data
E
H 1 2
1 1.92e¡3 2.32e¡3
2 1.54e¡3 4.59e¡3
Table 17 y16 y2 interaction data
y2
y1 1 2 3 4
1 6.16e¡3 5.12e¡3 1.84e¡3 2.16e¡3
2 2.1e¡3 1.17e¡3 3.7e¡3 3.4e¡3
3 3.01e¡3 1.78e¡3 1.86e¡3 1.85e¡3
4 2.22e¡3 1.77e¡3 1.58e¡3 1.81e¡3
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result of MDT violation. It is most likely that the  ttest
designs are associated with the lower test values, but
such results are obscured by penalties due to MDT
violation. Despite this, the best setting for both test
parameters was predicted to be level 2 (i.e. 30 week
intervals for each).
5.2 Optimum factor settings
The best settings of the factors suggested by the above
results are identical to those of the best design in the design
matrix of the follow-up experiment (note that the best
settings of factors P, K1, N1, K2 and N2 are carried
over from the initial experiment). As such, a veri cation
experiment is not required to establish the response asso-
ciated with the predicted best design. The performance
characteristics of the resulting best design are given in
Table 18. The safety system is over 99.9 per cent available
and achieves full use of the MDT resource.
6 DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
Data analysis of the initial experiment clearly indicated
that the optimal safety system design should constitute
pressure transmitters of type 1. It was further implied that
the optimal trip con guration using this pressure transmitter is
one from two for subsystem 1 and two from three for
subsystem 2. It was noted that the penalized designs were
causing a bias in themain effects, and, as such, further analysis
was carried out to determinewhich parameters had the greatest
effect on constraint violation. The implication was that para-
meters E, H, V and y1 are the most in uential. Logic dictates
that parameter y2 is also in uential as regards system MDT.
In light of this evidence, a more detailed follow-up
experiment was implemented using the factors stated
above. A study of potential key interactions was also
incorporated. It was found that parameters V and E and V
and H portrayed a synergistic interaction, whereas E and
H and both test parameters portrayed an antisynergistic
interaction. The interaction plots indicated that the optimal
safety system design incorporated no ESD valves and two
HIPS valves, with both test intervals set at 30 week inter-
vals. The optimum level predicted for each factor corre-
sponded to the best design in the follow-up matrix
experiment. The system unavailability of the design is
7.366 10¡4 with no constraint violations.
7 APPLICATION OF LOCAL OPTIMIZATION
TECHNIQUES
It is expected that K1 and N1, in addition to K2 and N2, will
portray signi cant interaction. A matrix experiment could be
developed in a similar vein to that described in section 5 to
investigate these interactions further. In the main, however,
the experimental approach is a global technique that consid-
ers the entire search space to glean greater knowledge in
order to determine potentially good (and bad) areas of the
space. This knowledge can then be used to assist further,
more sophisticated techniques.
The grid-sampling technique [19] and logical search
approach [19] are, in contrast, localized, hill-climbing meth-
ods that rely on a good start point to achieve an optimal
solution. As opposed to further re nement of the resulting
design speci ed in Table 18, using SDEs, the design vector
is used as an initial design point in the aforementioned
localized approaches.
Using the grid-sampling technique, it was found that a
safety system design more optimal than the initial design
vector could not be achieved. An explanation for this could
be that the initial design vector is exceedingly  t. As such,
the errors introduced via the use of approximate objective
functions to analyze the search space about the initial design
point are large in comparison with the difference between
the initial design vector and the global minimum.
The  nal design resulting from application of the logical
search approach has a one from two as opposed to a two
from three pressure transmitter trip con guration constitut-
ing subsystem 2, in addition to modi cation of the main-
tenance test interval parameters. An improvement of 1.3£
Fig. 5 Effects plot for the E6H and y16 y2 interactions
Table 18 Characteristics of the estimated
optimal design
Subsystem 1
E 0
K1/N1 1/2
y 30
Subsystem 2
H 2
K2/N2 2/3
y 30
V 2
P 1
MDT 130
Cost 822
Spurious trip frequency 0.72
System unavailability 7.366 10¡4
Penalized system unavailability 7.366 10¡4
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10¡3 in system unavailability is achieved, resulting in a
safety system design that is over 99.92 per cent available.
The logical search approach implements an accurate inves-
tigation of the region directly surrounding the value of each
variable in the initial design vector while considering the
degree of interaction between the design variables.
The initial point proves in this case to be suf ciently  t
for the believed global optimum to be found.
8 CONCLUSIONS AND SUMMARY
The use of orthogonal arrays to develop an experimental
design is an ef cient way to study the effects of several
control factors simultaneously. It is bene cial to adopt an
iterative approach to acquire knowledge as the experimental
plan progresses, and thus adapt the process accordingly.
Designs suggested by the technique are tested for con rma-
tion of their predictive potential, preventing the selection of
a poor design. In the worst-case scenario (i.e. if any factors
exhibit strong interactions), good and bad regions of the
search space are identi ed and an indication of the relative
importance of each factor is acquired. As such, further
exploration can proceed using an appropriate local search
technique based on the information established. In the best-
case scenario, the optimum level for some, if not all, of the
factors is determined. Importantly, the experimental effort
required is much smaller when compared with other meth-
ods of exploration such as trial and error, one factor at a time
and full factorial experiments.
It is recognized that investigatingmany design parameters
at two relatively extreme values does not carry the sophis-
tication of other more detailed and complex methods.
However, the more detailed design methods work more
ef ciently if they are working to update a reasonable
design. It is suggested that this SDE approach be used not
to produce a  nal design itself but to locate a good starting
point for a more complex design approach that is capable of
modelling each design variable at more levels.
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